INTRODUCTION
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States' held that the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 2 does not prescribe the scope of appellate review of a finding of actual malice in defamation cases governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 3 Rather, as a matter of "federal constitutional law," 4 appellate courts "must exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity." 5 Thus, in addition to the familiar judicial duty to "say what the law is,"
' 6 the first amendment imposes a special duty with respect to law application: both trial and appellatejudges must examine the evidence, marshal the relevant adjudicative facts, 7 and then apply the controlling first amendment norms to those facts. 8 Appellate judges may accept the historical facts found in the court below, 9 but they may not defer to the first amendment law application conclusions of even inferior article III judges, no matter how "reasonable."
Although widely seen as an important victory for the media, 10 Bose did not, as the Supreme Court claimed, present a "procedural question of first impression."" The independent judgment rule had been clearly stated in Sullivan itself, 1 2 solidly embedded in the Court's precedents,' 3 and applied by the court below.' 4 What is significant about Bose is not its result, but its reasoning. Bose proffers a comprehensive rationale for the independent judgment rule, one grounded entirely upon concerns assertedly peculiar to the first amendment.' 5 But independent judgment in the first amendment context is merely one example of a systemic issue: the scope of judicial review of the adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional claims.' 6 This issue is tradifense are identical with the factors that determine whether the speech is unprotected, SeeJenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1973) .
9. 104 S. Ct. at 1959. Of course, as Bose makes plain, see id. at 1967 n.31, the independent law application requirement applies only to those facts decisive of the constitutional claim. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (grant of review to decide only whether statute constitutionally applied, not whether statute violated).
10. See High Court Calls for Special Care in Libel Appeals, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1984, at Al, col. 3. There is a surprisingly high rate of reversal by appellate courts in cases where plaintiffs have prevailed on actual malice. "When analysis is confined to review after a trial, 71% of defendants' appeals in cases involving rulings on actual malice have led to reversals." Brief of Amici at 17, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949 Ct. (1984 ; see also Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1983) (plaintiffs ultimately secure favorable judgments in only 5 to 10%o of all libel cases against media defendants). Moreover, the press seems increasingly distrustful of the role of the jury in defamation cases. See, e.g., Kaplan, CBS News Chief Hints at Doubt On Libel Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1984 13. See Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1962-65. The Court noted that the precedents most frequently involved application of the independent judgment rule "in cases to which Rule 52(a) does not apply because they arose in state courts." Id. at 1959. That distinction does not seem significant. In my view, Congress could provide for different scopes of Supreme Court review over the factfinding of state and federal courts, on the premise that state courts could not be "trusted." See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5. But, absent congressional direction, I agree with the substance of the Court's remark that "surely it would pervert the concept of federalism for this Court to lay claim to a broader power of review over state court judgments than it exercises in reviewing the judgments of intermediate federal courts." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1959. Moreover, the Court had previously assumed that independent judgment was required in libel cases originating in the federal trial courts. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971 tionally raised under the rubric of the constitutional fact doctrine. 1 7 In a great variety of contexts the pressing question is the extent to which the Constitution itself controls the allocation of functions among the various decisionmakers-appellate and trial judges, juries, administrative agencies-that commonly participate at some stage in the resolution of all types of constitutional claims. Bose provides an appropriate occasion to reconsider the role of appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court, in constitutional fact review.
In Bose, the fundamental disagreement between the Court and the three dissenting justices was how to characterize the question presented-whether the defendant acted with actual malice. The mathe parties and their businesses and activities." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee note ("Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case."). Legislative facts, on the other hand, "do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." 2 K. Davis, supra, § 12:3, at 413. The adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional claims usually pertain to the concrete application of a statute or regulation being challenged on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. Of course, no wholly satisfactory criteria exist for distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative facts, and for that reason the categories are at best "only an approach." Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 Rev. , 1268 Rev. (1975 . Like other legal distinctions, the difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is one of degree, and for that reason the existence of borderline cases does not mean that the distinction is empty. Nonetheless, the lack of precision is of some significance given the traditional rule that a litigant's right to a trial-type hearing before an administrative agency depends on whether adjudicative or legislative facts are at issue. Compare United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244 (1973) (applying "basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudication"), with Friendly, supra, at 1307-09 (disputing usefulness of this distinction as a means to determine right to trial-type hearing).
17. The term "constitutional fact Rev. 223 (1968) . Bose carefully avoids using the term "constitutional fact," mentioning it only once, in a footnote, and even then tying it to the first amendment. See 104 S. Ct. at 1964 n.27 (" 'The simple fact is that First Amendment questions of "constitutional" fact compel this Court's de novo review.' ") (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 54 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW jority viewed the question as one of first amendment law application, deserving of the Court's independent judgment. t8 The dissenters viewed the question as simply one of historical fact governed by Rule 52(a). 19 For both groups, the initial characterization determined the appropriate scope of appellate review.
It is not surprising that the justices in Bose were unable to agree on the proper characterization of the question presented. The difficulty has its origins in the "vexing" distinction between "questions of law" and "questions of fact." 20 This distinction has long caused perplexity in such diverse areas as contracts, 2 1 torts, 22 and administrative law. 20. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) .
Long ago, Professor Thayer commented on "[t]
he reasons for leaving questions as to the meaning and construction of writing to thejudges." Thayer, "Law and Fact" injury Trials, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 160 (1890). It is not "that these are questions of law, for, mainly, they are not." Id. (footnote omitted). Rather, Thayer understood the allocation to rest on "ground[s] of policy": "[s]uch things, so important, so long enduring, should have a fixed meaning; should not be subject to varying interpretations; should be interpreted by whatever tribunal is most permanent, best instructed, most likely to adhere to precedents." Id. at 161.
Antilles S.S. Co. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 733 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1984), provides a recent illustration of the confusion as to whether the interpretation of a contract is a question of law or fact. At issue was a shipowner's claim of coverage under a marinery hull and machine insurance policy. The evidence consisted of the policy and the testimony of two witnesses. The court of appeals said that analysis should center on the "parties' mutual understanding," an inquiry that embraced the "language of the policy and the circumstances surrounding its execution, custom and usage, as well as the established law." Id. at 199. Branding the "central question" both as "a mixed question of law and fact" and as one of "ultimate 'fact,'" id., the court set aside as clearly erroneous the trial court's finding for the plaintiff. Judge Newman's thoughtful concurring opinion contains a comprehensive examination of the allocation problem. He rejects the view of the leading text writers that the construction of a contract is always a question of fact, see 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, A Comprehensive Treatise on the Rules of Contract Law § 554 (1960); 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 616 (3d ed. 1961), in favor of the view that it is such a question only if extrinsic evidence is relied upon. 733 F.2d at 204. judge Newman thus voted with the majority to reverse, not because the lower court's finding was clearly erroneous, but because he believed that the lower court's conclusion was wrong as a matter of law. Id. at 207.
22. In torts, questions relating to negligence cause the most difficulty since the law to be applied is a standard: whether the defendant acted as a reasonable man would have under the circumstances. Traditionally, application of the reasonableness standard to the facts is for the jury. Since "the legal profession has so long accepted it as axiomatic that the jury has no power except to find facts," Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1924) , determinations whether a defendant acted negligently have generally been spoken of as "mixed questions of law and fact." Id. at 112. According to Professor Bohlen, "it is time to recognize that this supposed axiom is not accurate." Id. at 115. He is surely right. In deciding questions of negligence, the jury is called upon to exercise its judgment to formulate a more precise standard by which to evaluate some particular act or omission. Strictly speaking, this task is neither factfinding nor law declaration. Thus, the allocation of negligence questions to the jury [Vol. 85:229 Some would insist that this condition exists because the asserted distinction is fundamentally incoherent. 24 The incoherence argument seems greatly overdrawn 2 5 once it is recognized that any distinction posited between "law" and "fact" does not imply the existence of static, polar opposites. Rather, law and fact have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience. In our legal system, the categories have functioned as crucially important constructs that permit us to understand, organize, and regulate certain forms of social experience. 26 Most important, they find expression in the constitutional text. Article III invests Congress with power rests on grounds of policy, not on abstract conceptions of the intrinsic nature of the question itself. Cf. Antilles S.S. Co. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 733 F.2d 195, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring) (determination of negligence could be viewed as a question of law, but is left to the jury for practical reasons).
23. See L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 546-55. It must be noted, however, given the broad delegation of power-especially rulemaking power-to administrative agencies, that they necessarily possess considerable lawmaking authority. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 25-26.
24. This attitude has always had prominent adherents.
["Law" and "fact" are] equally expansible and collapsible terms .... It is readily acknowledged that the term "law" is indefinable. No less difficult to bound is the orbit of that companionate phantom "fact." . . . No two terms of legal science have rendered better service than "law" and "fact." They are basic assumptions; irreducible minimums and the most comprehensive maximums at the same instant. They readily accommodate themselves to any meaning we desire to give them. . . . What judge has not found refuge in them?
The man who could succeed in defining them would be a public enemy. L. Green, Judge and Jury 270 (1930) .
In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "questions of fact" really gives little help in determining how far the courts will review; and for the good reason that there is no fixed distinction. They are not two mutually exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without a break, into matters of law. The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point where the court chooses to draw the line between public interest and private right. It would seem that when the courts are unwilling to review, they are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the question one of "fact"; and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of "law."
J. Dickinson over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fact,"1 27 and the seventh amendment provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined. . . than according to the rules of the common law."1 2 8 Quite clearly, any analysis that purports to take the constitutional text seriously must try to make some sense out of these categories. The confusion exhibited in judicial opinions over law and fact stems from two sources. First, courts assume that the properly affixed characterization necessarily determines which legal actor is assigned the decisionmaking task. Second, the two categories have been used to describe at least three distinct functions: law declaration, fact identification, and law application. 29 To be sure, the categories of law and fact have traditionally served an important regulatory function in distributing authority among various decisionmakers in the legal system. 3 0 But there is no imperative that a properly affixed characterization necessarily controls allocation of functions. 3 ' And, quite plainly, the actual distribution of authority between judges and other decisionmakers has often been governed by other factors, such as the nature of the substantive issue and the character of the decisionmakers. 3 2 That is, viewing the statutory or common law scheme as a whole, the judges decide on an "appropriate" division of functions between themselves and others engaged in the law-declaring or law-applying process. 3 30. For example, it is often said that "questions of law" are for judges and "questions of fact" for thejury. See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 21, at 147.
31. In every area, as Professor Thayer long ago observed, "judges have always answered a multitude of questions of ultimate fact involved in the issue. It is true that this has often been disguised by calling them questions of law." Id. at 159; see also Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1052 (3d Cir. 1984) ("When the question is one of contract interpretation, the difference between factual and legal conclusions is often confused with the assignment of functions between court and jury.").
32. See Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1960 n.17. 33. For example, though the question of negligence may involve considerable norm elaboration, a function ordinarily performed by judges, the question has long been viewed as one for thejury. See L. Green, supra note 24, at 153-85; Bohlen, supra note 22, at I 11-12; supra note 22. On contracts, see supra note 21. The field of administrative law provides another illustration, for it is now quite clear that agencies can be empowered with significant law declaration competence. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 2-7, 25-3 1. Thus, to characterize an issue as one of "law" is not to decide that it falls within the province of the court rather than the administrative agency. 37. L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 548. Inferences drawn from such assertions are also facts, so long as they rest on general experience. Id. at 549; see United States v. Kowalchuck, 744 F.2d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 1984). I would also include as facts terms that are used to classify for legal purposes, but whose legal content is not at issue in the case at hand. See L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 550-51; see also Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 855 (1985) (prospective juror's "bias" with respect to capital punishment is a factual issue). Professor Jaffe notes that special difficulties are involved where facts are themselves constructed from statistical data or are otherwise the result of a complex set of inferences. Regarding the confiscation rate cases, see infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text, Jaffe writes:
The "facts" themselves-value of investment, costs of service, value of service, rate of return-are abstract. They are derived from a mass of statistical data which is in turn abstract, the result of a sophisticated classification of the underlying data. If the annual rate of depreciation of assets of a billion dollar corporation is a "fact," it is nevertheless a very different kind of fact from the bigness of Cyrano's nose. L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 646. trine of naive realism; the question is "not whether the fact exists in an absolute sense but whether the evidence is adequate to justify the exercise of [the decisionmaker's] power." '3 8 This means that while "what happened" may be viewed as a question of fact, the legal sufficiency of the evidence 3 9 may be viewed as the equivalent of a question of law".
4
Law application, the third function, is residual in character. It involves relating the legal standard of conduct to the facts established by the evidence. 41 If all legal propositions could be formulated in great detail, this function would be rather mechanical and require no distinctive consideration. But such is not the case. Linking the rule to the conduct is a complex psychological process, one that often involves judgment. The more general the rule, the larger the domain for judgment. 42 Thus, law application frequently entails some attempt to elaborate the governing norm. But in contrast to the generalizing feature of law declaration, law application is situation-specific; any ad hoc norm elaboration is, in theory, like a ticket good for a specific trip only. Moreover, in this kind of situation, specific norm elaboration is generally invisible. 4 3 By definition, when law application occurs, further explicit norm elaboration ceases. And any implicit norm elaboration may be buried in a general verdict and in the decisionmaker's resolution of the controversy over the facts. The typical jury verdict in a negligence case provides a good example.
44
Quite plainly, anterior to law application a crucial policy decision must be made: should a further effort at norm elaboration be under- Law application decisions in the lower federal courts may lead the Supreme Court to believe that further norm elaboration is needed. 48 Still, the important point for our purposes is that law declaration occurs only to the extent that further general norm elaboration occurs.
In light of the foregoing, it seems misguided to assume, as many courts apparently do, that all law application judgments can be dissolved into either law declaration or fact identification. 49 Law application is a distinctive operation. 50 The real issue is not analytic, 5 i but allocative: what decisionmaker should decide the issue? 52 Our system has not proceeded on the premise that judges, to say nothing of appellate judges, must render independent judgment on all law application. Many such decisions are left in the hands ofjuries, masters, and admin- 
1985]
istrative agencies. Bose confirms this point. The Court assumed that, but for the Constitution, no independent appellate review would be required. It did not hold that all questions of law application should be assimilated to law declaration so that Rule 52(a) has no applicability. 5 3 A contrary holding would have rendered the independent judgment rule in constitutional cases simply a subset of law application in general, always to be viewed as essentially a "question of law." '5 4 Viewed in this way, the key question is whether constitutional law application differs from ordinary law application. Bose provides an affirmative answer, but attempts to limit it to the first amendment context. Yet Bose presents simply one example of constitutional fact review, and the Court's reasoning is not easily confined to the first amendment context. We commonly assume that there is something distinctive about judicial review of the adjudicative facts decisive of any constitutional claim. This Article examines what that assumption implies about the proper scope of constitutional fact review in the appellate courts.
Constitutional fact review presupposes that appellate courts will render independent judgment on any issues of constitutional "law" presented. Its distinctive feature is a requirement of similar independent judicial judgment on issues of constitutional law "application." That is, the courts must sort out the relevant facts and apply to them the controlling constitutional norms. Firmly embedded case law establishes that, absent limiting legislation, federal appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court, possess that authority. This Article will argue, however, that constitutional fact review at the appellate level is a matter for judicial (and legislative) discretion, not a constitutional imperative. This discretion can be made responsive to important institutional [Vol. 85:229 CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW needs. The most important of these are the danger of systemic bias of other actors in the judicial system and the need for continuous development of constitutional principles on a case-by-case basis. But appellate courts are under no inexorable compulsion to review every application of settled constitutional norms to the historical facts. 55 Law declaration, not law application, is the appellate courts' only constitutionally mandated duty. 56 And, considered afresh, I see no compelling considerations for positing a different principle for the first amendment.
In the process of this argument this Article will contrast the role of appellate courts with that of courts asked to enforce the constitutional law application decisions of administrative agencies. 5 7 In the latter context a strong argument can be made that enforcement tribunals must undertake constitutional fact review. Indeed, in that context constitutional fact review may entail even more: the court may be required independently to find the relevant historical facts on the basis of its own record. But the reasons for these requirements are rooted in the "legitimacy deficit" inherent in administrative adjudication. The rise of administrative adjudication is at variance with the original constitutional premise that most adjudication would take place in judicial, not administrative, tribunals. Constitutional fact review in the context of judicial review of administrative conduct seeks to ameliorate that legitimacy deficit. So viewed, it does not establish the propriety of a similar scope of review by an appellate court over the decisions of an inferior court.
I. INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT A. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States
Bose began as a trade libel suit in a district court. Consumers Union had published a magazine article evaluating the qualities of numerous brands of loudspeaker systems, including one marketed by the Bose Corporation. While the plaintiff objected to several statements in the article, the case ultimately turned on only one: the path of the 55. If I am right, the power of the federal courts to render independent judgment on constitutional law application must be treated as a gloss on the present statutes prescribing appellate jurisdiction. It would be too far afield to discuss the source of the powers or duties of the state courts, particularly the source of the power, if any, of state courts to render independent judgment on constitutional law application where the federal Constitution does not require it.
56. I do not consider here the judicial duty under statutes or rules that enlarge the scope of appellate review. For example, the ancient practice in equity appeals opened all questions of law and fact (not resting on credibility) to the independent judgment of the appellate court. Nor do I consider whether distinctive issues are implicated in appellate review of federal statutory claims. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Gover- 57. An appellate court may also be charged with immediate review of an administrative determination of constitutional fact when, for example, it is asked to enforce an sound heard through the speakers. The article stated that the sound tended to wander "about the room"; but, sitting without a jury, the judge found that the sound tended to wander "along the wall" between the speakers. 58 After concluding that the article contained a false and disparaging 59 statement of "fact," '60 and that for purposes of this litigation the Bose Corporation was a public figure, 6 ' the judge found clear and convincing proof of actual malice. The crucial conclusion that the article writer, who had testified extensively, knew at the time of publication that the offending statement was false rested on a single premise: the article writer "is an intelligent person whose knowledge of the English language cannot be questioned. It is simply impossible. . . to believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as 'about' to mean anything other than its plain, ordinary meaning." 62 The First Circuit reversed. 6 3 Accepting dubitante that the offending comment was one of fact rather than opinion, 64 the court concluded that Rule 52(a) does not govern the scope of appellate review of a finding of actual malice. 65 And making its own independent determination, the court found nothing more than the use of "imprecise language."
The Arguably, the court did not make an independent determination of the evidence, but instead applied a slightly different standard-that of the "reasonable publisher"-to the facts found below. This reading is consistent with the court's failure to dispute the trial court's central finding with respect to actual malice: that the author knew at the time of publication that certain statements in the article were false. Cf. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1958 (rejecting finding of actual malice on ground that trial court "did not identify any independent evidence that [the author] realized the inaccuracy of the statement, or entertained serious doubts about its truthfulness, at the time of publication") (footnote omitted).
240
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CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW given point in time as a question of 'fact,' ",67 and that Rule 52(a) applies even to findings of "ultimate facts." 68 But, said the Court, the Constitution requires judges to exercise independent judgment as to whether there exists clear and convincing proof of actual malice. 69 The Court made clear that this requirement is not a special rule for public figure defamation cases. The Court extensively reviewed precedents emphasizing the independent judgment rule in a wide variety of speech contexts, 70 and it repeated Sullivan's insistence that " '[t]his Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied.' "71 The three dissenting justices insisted that the article writer's actual knowledge was simply a question of "historical fact" governed by Rule 52(a).
72
Bose could be understood not as implicating the constitutional fact doctrine at all, but as resting instead on the ground that the quantum of evidence before the district judge was insufficient to permit an inference about the article writer's intent. 72. Id. at 1967 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1968-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (joined by O'Connor, J.). The differences between the Court and the three dissenters should not be exaggerated. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that in many cases independent appellate review is constitutionally appropriate. Id. at 1969 n.2. But, quite plainly, he believed that though this case presented "close questions," id. at 1970, what the article writer actually knew about his use of language presented a routine issue of historical fact, resting, as it did, on the article writer's "credibility." Id. at 1969. On its part, the Court did not deny that appellate judges are bound by findings of historical fact. Its ultimate conclusion was that
[w]e may accept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and nevertheless hold as a matter of law that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that [the article writer] or his employer prepared the loudspeaker article with knowledge that it contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 1967 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1956-58. As the Court understood the record, the district judge had ceeded on a quite different conception of what is involved, speaking repeatedly of the duty of appellate judges to decide independently whether the facts are sufficient to show that the speech is unprotected. First amendment law application, as well as first amendment law declaration, is part of the judicial duty. An appellate court cannot content itself with accepting the results of a "reasonable" application of admittedly correct legal norms to the historical facts. The court's responsibility is to scrutinize the record and marshal the evidence to see if it yields the characterization put on it by the court below. 74 The Court's justification for its demand of independent appellate judgment warrants close attention. The Court begins with some backing and filling. First, the distance between independent judgment and clearly erroneous review is minimized, then acknowledged to be "much more than a mere matter of degree." '75 Next, we are told that the "vexing nature" of the distinction between law and fact does not "diminish its [constitutional] importance." '7 6 These preliminaries put aside, the Court turns to the basis of the independent judgment rule with respect to actual malice. That review is required for three reasons:
First, the common law heritage of the [actual malice] rule itself assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to specific factual situations. Second, the content of the rule is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the evolutionary process of common law adjudication; though the source of the rule is found in the Constitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law. Finally, the constitutional values protected by the rule make it imperative that judges-and in some cases judges of this Court-make sure that it is correctly applied. ties aside, they would suggest that independent judgment is appropriate only in those first amendment cases where the substantive constitutional rule has a common law foundation or where the contours of the rule must be hammered out on a case-by-case basis. But the importance of having a common law ancestry for a constitutional rule is never defended and is surely not self-demonstrating. 78 And if emphasis is to be placed instead on the necessity for case-by-case adjudication, independent review would be required for the great bulk of Bill of Rights claims since the contours of those provisions have been developed in that manner.7 9 That the Court is not serious about the first two justifications becomes apparent once we examine its elaboration of the third justification. In reviewing the wide range of first amendment cases in which the independent judgment rule has been applied-fighting words, incitement to riot, contempt, obscenity, and child pornography 8 -the Court makes plain the driving impulse of its decision: independent review is required to protect first amendment values. To my eye, the core of the opinion is contained in two sentences:
[T]he Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the record both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited. Providing triers of fact with a general description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas. 8 '
The Court's approach has considerable intuitive appeal. It has long been clear that the substantive constitutional guarantees, particularly the first amendment, have important remedial dimensions. 8 2 And, by fastening the demand for independent judgment to special first amendment considerations, the Court seemingly bypasses the need to 78. Without explaining its significance for constitutional law, the Court said this common law rule permitted a large role for the judge. Id 
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW face more systemic considerations. As we shall see, however, the Court's rationale is ultimately unpersuasive.
B. Implications of Bose
Sooner or later, the Supreme Court must confront a range of issues for which its Bose opinion provides little guidance. Quite obviously, the Court must determine whether Bose's independent judgment requirement applies to all first amendment claims, 83 and it must also assess the significance of its reasoning for administrative agencies. 84 More important than Bose's horizontal sweep, however, is its vertical reach. Bose demands independent judicial judgment on whether speech is constitutionally protected. But, particularly in defamation cases, large damage awards pose greater threats to first amendment values than do findings of liability. 85 There is, accordingly, considerable interest in imposing controls on the amount of recoverable damages, most generally by eliminating certain items, such as punitive damages, from any recovery. 8 6 Any such development would be affected by assump-
83. An obscure footnote suggests that commercial speech cases might be treated differently. 104 S. Ct. at 1961 n.22. Perhaps the "hardy" character of commercial speech might be thought to obviate the need for the special protection accorded to speech more easily chilled. See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
Even with respect to defamation actions, Bose needs further elaboration. For example, the Court makes no mention of its decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), in which it applied a clearly erroneous standard in reviewing a state court jury determination that a publication was not "factually correct." Id. at 457-59. 84. What counts as an historical fact is an important problem in this context. Bose indicates that inferences drawn from and characterizations put upon primary facts, unless based upon witness credibility, are a nondelegable judicial responsibility. Applied rigorously, this would have a significant impact upon administrative law, for it would mean that courts should refuse the normally accorded deference to the inference-drawing capacities of "expert" agencies. On the meaning of deference generally, see Monaghan, supra note 6, at 4-5. Under this view, for example, a court could not defer to the labor board's conclusion that certain employer speech is constitutionally unprotected because "coercive." Statements that "a reviewing court must recognize the Board's competence in the first instance to judge the impact [of the speech] in the context of the employer-employee relationship," NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619-20 (1969), could not be understood to compel real deference to the board's view that the speech is unprotected. At most, the board's conclusion would act simply as a caution to the reviewing court. In addition, the Supreme Court must determine the contours of the "duty" of independent review. Initially, the Court must decide whether both parties, or only the free speech claimant, can demand independent appellate review; that is, can the party opposing the free speech claim demand independent appellate judgment on the first amendment law application point?"" Suppose, for example, that in Bose the judge had found that there was no clear and convincing proof of actual knowledge or recklessness. Could Bose Corporation, the party opposing the first amendment defense, insist upon independent appellate review? That possibility is left open by the Court's ultimate holding in Bose, where it frames its conclusion "as a matter of law" on the historical facts found by the district judge, 8 9 and by Connick v. Mllyers, 90 in which, in reversing a finding in favor of the free speech claimant, the Court stated that the question whether the speech was protected or not presented a question of law. 9 ' The rationale used to explain whether the party opposing the free speech claim is also entitled to independent judgment will have considerable importance in understanding the independent judgment rule, both in the first amendment context and elsewhere. The cases reflect a special judicial concern that the claim of federal right not be incorrectly denied. But if labeling something a question of constitutional fact guarantees that it will be treated like a question of law, then either party is entitled to independent appellate review. In Bose itself, the Supreme Court reviewed de novo the conclu- 
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How the duty concept is to be understood is also unclear. Bose stresses the rhetoric of obligation; indeed, the duty of independent judgment is said to lie "particularly [upon] members of this Court."
92
Quite plainly, judicial authority to make an independent judgment on constitutional law application is one thing-a judicial duty to do so, quite another. The effort to locate the duty in the first amendment is troublesome given the general rule that there is no constitutional right to appellate review in any civil case. 93 Is there a special requirement of some appellate review in first amendment cases? 9 4 If so, does that requirement extend to the Supreme Court itself? Given the "deeply held conviction that judges-and particularly members of this Court-must exercise [independent] review," 9 5 can the Court properly deny petitions for review in first amendment cases where the sole issue is whether, on the evidence, the free speech claim has been correctly rejected? May the Court properly limit its grant of review to whether correct first amendment standards have been employed, leaving the "routine" law application point for final disposition in the court below? 96 Or is the only point of Bose that if an appellate court turns to the law application issue, then must it render its own independent judgment?
In considering the nature of the appellate "duty" stressed by Bose, one should bear in mind not only its potentially burdensome character, particularly for a tribunal with the wide-ranging responsibilities of the Supreme Court, but also the evident strain that constitutional fact review often places on the Court's institutional capacity. Cox v. Louisiana 9 7 illustrates both problems. In Cox, the Court sustained a first Bose, may such a court refuse review, or grant review on a limited basis? The issue is not raised squarely if the decision below is in favor of the free speech claimant, or if it rests upon some ground independent of the first amendment claim.
On the question whether either Congress or the states can so structure theirjudicial systems that constitutional issues must be raised in only certain courts, see Monaghan, supra note 6, at 19-20.
97. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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[Vol. 85:229 CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW amendment defense to a breach of the peace conviction, but reversal of the state supreme court on this point was possible only because the Court undertook an extensive independent inquiry into a very detailed record. 9 8 In the process, the Court rejected not only the state supreme court's plausible characterization of the evidentiary facts, but also the trial court's "feel" for what the evidence amounted to. 99 
II. THE ORIGINS AND VAGARIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
Thus far, this Article has treated independent appellate review in first amendment cases as a particular application of the constitutional fact doctrine. But in origin and line of development, constitutional fact review is far removed from appellate review in first amendment cases. Although the evolution of the constitutional fact doctrine has been anything but straightforward, a brief examination makes apparent the general utility of distinguishing between two quite different contexts of constitutional fact review: judicial control of the administrative state and appellate review of the decisions of inferior tribunals.
A. Judicial Control of the Administrative State
Article III could have been read to require that Congress assign all the federal adjudicatory business specified therein to some court, whether an article III court or a state court.1 0 0 The Supreme Court has never embraced such a position, however.' 0 ' Most important for our purposes, nineteenth century decisions established that "public rights"-largely claims by private individuals against the government for such matters as pensions and land patents, claims to which the government could entirely refuse consent to suitl 0 2 -might, if Congress so 98. See, e.g., id. at 541-43 nn.2-6, 546-49 nn.9-1 1. The Court emphasized the duty language, saying that "[b]ecause a claim of constitutionally protected right is involved, it 'remains our duty in a case such as this to make an independent examination of the whole record.' " Id. at 545 n.8 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) In time, however, the imperatives of the administrative state utterly destroyed this assumption as a working principle of government, for effective regulation presupposed a much larger role for administrative adjudication than that allowed by the nineteenth century conceptions of public rights. The story is too well known to justify retelling here. Suffice it to say that by the time of Crowell v. Benson,' 0 5 a fundamental transformation in American law had occurred. The Constitution's "preference" for adjudication of disputes by the regular courts had in large part collapsed. In Crowell, the Supreme Court recognized that it was too late to cut back significantly on the adjudicatory apparatus of the modern administrative state. Crowell not only reconfirmed the public rights cases, it expressly sanctioned, subject to limited judicial review, administrative adjudication of the duty of one private person to another arising from government regulatory programs. In recognizing a wide area for the operation of public administration, Crowell removed both article III and the due process clause as meaningful barriers to the use of administrative agencies to establish and enforce, at least initially, all of the rights and duties created by the emerging administrative state.' 0 6
But focusing on the "normal" pattern of administrative adjudication that characterizes the present era does not tell the whole story. Traditionally, judges have assumed that they were ordained by the Constitution to demark legitimate claims of public administration from illegitimate interferences with private rights. This judicial task was thought to include not only enforcing the substantive constitutional guarantees, but also setting some limits to the kinds of controversies [Vol. 85:229 CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW that could be resolved by the rapidly growing number of administrative agencies. While slowly yielding "ordinary" factfinding and law application to administrative agencies, judges increasingly resorted to constitutional fact review as a means of structuring the "appropriate" allocation of functions between agency and court. 1 0 7
Constitutional fact review had its antecedents in the doctrine of jurisdictional fact, which the English superior courts, particularly King's Bench, developed to confine administrative agencies and inferior courts within their delegated authority.' 0 8 The jurisdictional fact concept emerged as a construct for partitioning functions between agencies and the superintending courts:' 0 9 "ordinary facts" could be left for final administrative determination, but the superior courts would render independent judgment upon those "facts" governing the agency's "jurisdiction." ' "1 0 And though the distinction between ordinary and jurisdictional fact was not, and could not be, expressed with logical precision, it was not on that account empty. Its basis seems to have been intuitive and functional, a device employed to permit judicial control of administrative action to prevent what, in terms of the statutory scheme under review, would be viewed as an important error. I1 s Bench to all inferior jurisdictions "to see that they keep themselves within their jurisdiction; and if they exceed it, to restrain them").
110. "The practical result of the doctrine of 'jurisdictional fact' is to throw open for re-examination in court facts which, if they were not held to be 'jurisdictional,' would be concluded either by the decision of the administrative body or at least by the evidence at its disposal." Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1060 (citation omitted). Indeed, where necessary the English courts showed a tendency to take evidence and make their own findings on jurisdictional facts, L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 628-29, and this was the scope of jurisdictional fact review adopted in the American courts. See id. at 633. Emphasizing cases that reviewed administrative determinations by certiorari, however, Professor Dickinson argues that the jurisdictional fact doctrine only rarely resulted in independent judicial factfinding. Moreover, he asserts that most courts applying the doctrine declined even to exercise independent judgment on the administrative record, accepting instead the existence of the jurisdictional fact if it could have been found by "reasonable men on the evidence presented in the administrative proceeding." Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1067.
Arguably, Professor Dickinson takes too narrow an historical view of the jurisdictional fact doctrine by focusing on only the certiorari cases, in which the scope of appellate review was limited by the special requirements of the writ. And in any case, the distance between Professor Dickinson and Professor Jaffe should not be overstated. Both agreed that the jurisdictional fact doctrine assumed that courts were competent in all cases to exercise whatever scope of review was necessary to ensure that agency action was not ultra vires, yet neither believed that the doctrine imposed a duty on courts to exercise a given level of review in any particular case.
111. See L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 631-33. the first Supreme Court decision applying the due process clause to restrict the states. Invoking the "wisdom of successive ages," ' 1 4 the Court held that the due process clause requires judicial review of a claim that administratively prescribed rates are confiscatory.
1 5 The Court said that the "question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation."'1 16
The Supreme Court did not squarely address the scope of the that, in principle, the issue presented by the jurisdictional fact doctrine was at one level simply a question of statutory construction.
If the legislature desires and intends to make the validity of an administrative determination turn on whether or not the existence of a particular fact shall be later proved to the satisfaction of a court, the court must give effect to the legislative intent and determine for itself in the review proceeding the existence of the fact. Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1063. But, as Professor Dickinson acknowledges, thejurisdictional fact doctrine also reflected a general approach by courts to the control of administrative conduct, both in England and in the United States. Id. at 1064-67; see also L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 634 ("The concept ofjurisdictional fact was devised originally by English and American courts to justify a fairly limited judicial review of orders otherwise immune.").
112. The doctrine of constitutional fact. . . applies to constitutional limitations on administrative jurisdiction the same reasoning which the doctrine ofjurisdictional fact applies to statutory limitations. Just as a statute may confine jurisdiction to cases where a certain fact exists, so the constitution may be construed to limit jurisdiction to the presence or absence of a fact-situation. Dickinson, supra note 16, at 1067; see also id. at 1072 ("The doctrine of constitutional fact is the doctrine of jurisdictional fact in special form.").
113 [I]f the owner claims confiscation of his property will result, the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the due process clause .... 118 More important, the Court assumed that the judicial task did not simply embrace judicial application of the constitutional norm of a "fair return" to the administratively found facts. The crucial issue dividing the litigants was the value of the utility's property, and on that issue the Court required independent judicial judgment."1 9 Nonetheless, the case should not be overstated. Ben Avon does not address the scope of Supreme Court review over state courts. Indeed, at the time the limitations of review by writ of error greatly restricted that power. 120 
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that the independent judgment of some state judicial tribunal must be provided on the "value" component of a confiscation claim.
Ben Avon need not have spawned constitutional fact review outside of the rate setting context. The case was decided against two closely related background premises: first, that a legislature could set rates so long as some court was available to hear claims that the rates were confiscatory;' 22 and second, that no legislature could insulate its actions from judicial review by determining initially the facts upon which the constitutionality of those actions depended and thereafter making such factual findings binding upon the courts. 1 2 3 Once the Ben Avon Court had concluded that the state agency had performed a "legislative" act in setting the challenged rates,' 2 4 it seemed axiomatic that the agency's findings of constitutional fact must be subject to the same level of review that would apply to similar findings made by a legislature.12 124. The Court was unanimous on this point, see 253 U.S. at 289; id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), relying largely on its earlier decision in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (state agency regulating corporations, though a court for some purposes, performs "legislative" function when setting rates). Tracing the rise of agency involvement in rate setting, Dean Landis observes that by the turn of the century, [rate setting] appeared to be more of a legislative power than ajudicial power. The administrative was seen as taking the place of the legislature so that its functioning was easier to analogize to the exercise of power by the legislative branch of government than by the judicial branch. J. Landis, The Administrative Process 126 (1938).
It was apparent from the outset, however, that rate setting was not always comfortably analogized to legislation. At some stages of the process, the agency functioned like a court. See, e.g., ICC v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) (where agency hears complaint that rates for a single carrier are unreasonable, proceeding is "quasi-judicial" and must afford trial-type protections). Confusion over the proper characterization of rate setting persists even today. Compare United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 243-46 (1973) (where agency rate order applied prospectively to all railroads within agency's jurisdiction, agency engaged in "rulemaking"), with id. at 253-54 (Douglas,J., dissenting) (where agency bases rates on evidentiary facts, agency engaged in "adjudication"). See generally Friendly, supra note 16, at 1305-10 (criticizing Florida East Coast majority).
125. See Ben Avon, 253 U.S. at 289; Larson, supra note 17, at 211. Counsel for the Ohio Water Company were careful to present the Court with this syllogism in order to fit their case within the accepted precedents. See Buchanan, supra note 117, at 1037.
126. The Court's analogy to legislative action is troublesome. It seems likely that agency action of the type present in Ben Avon-setting rates for a single utility after an evidentiary hearing-would today be assimilated to adjudication, not legislation, See supra note 124. But even granting the Court its characterization of the issue, a further problem remains. Legislative action has traditionally enjoyed a presumption of constitu-
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It is enough to note that Ben Avon's independent judgment rule could have been limited to cases in which the agency was performing what were then understood as "legislative" functions.
That the Supreme Court would not view constitutional fact review so narrowly became quickly apparent. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 127 decided only two years after Ben Avon, sanctioned constitutional fact review in the context of what was clearly "adjudicative" action by an administrative agency. At issue were habeas challenges to administrative deportation warrants. Petitioners insisted that their deportation was improper because they were United States citizens. Administrative rejection of petitioners' claims was not conclusive on the courts, said Justice Brandeis, because citizenship is "an essential jurisdictional fact."1 2 8 Deportation works an obvious and grievous loss of liberty, and "[a]gainst the danger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings," the due process clause "affords protection."' 129 This, the Court insisted, was not novel doctrine. "The difference in security of judicial over administrative action has been adverted to by this court."' 130 Once again, however, the thrust of the opinion was a requirement of independent judgment by some-but not all-courts.
In Crowell v. Benson, 13 1 a divided Court both confirmed and generalized the constitutional fact doctrine in strong terms. While conceding that ordinary facts could be established in the administrative process, the Court held that constitutional facts must be found by the courts. Thus, an employer challenging a federal administrative compensation order was entitled to an independent judicial determination of whether the injury occurred on navigable waters, as well as of the existence of the employer-employee relationship. These conditions were considered indispensable to the application of the statute "not only because tionality; legislative findings are upheld if "reasonable." See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924); Bikl6, supra note 123, at 21. Yet the Ben Avon Court made no effort to explain why this same presumption should not also attach to agency actions that were assertedly "legislative." Cf.J. Dickinson, supra note 24, at 199 ("Surely the formal conclusions of fact reached by an administrative tribunal after a hearing and the taking of testimony should be entitled to as much respect as findings of fact supposed to have been made by a legislative body as the implied basis for its enactments."). That the Court felt no need to defend this point may have reflected its internalization of the ongoing assault-in the name of "substantive" due process-on the supremacy of legislative findings in areas of economic regulation.
127 the Congress has so provided explicitly. . . but also because the power of the Congress to enact the legislation turns upon the existence of these conditions."' 13 2 The ground was article III, not due process: In relation to these basic facts, the question is not the ordinary one as to the propriety of provision for administrative determinations. . . . It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial power in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions. It is the question whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency-in this instance a single deputy commissioner-for the final determination of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend. 13 3 In an elaborate dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis argued that article III provided no support for a constitutional fact doctrine, 1 3 4 although he acknowledged that on occasion the due process clause would require judicial process. 1 3 5
B. Independent Record
While this Article focuses on constitutional fact review in the Supreme Court, it would be radically incomplete if it did not notice another aspect of constitutional fact review: the independent record requirement. In Crowell, Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion states:
The primary question for consideration is not whether Congress provided, or validly could provide, that determinations of fact by the deputy commissioner should be conclusive upon the district court. The question is: Upon what record shall the district court's review of the order of the deputy commissioner be based? The courts below held that the respondent was entitled to a trial de novo; that all the evidence introduced before the deputy commissioner should go for naught; and that respondent should have the privilege of presenting new, and even entirely different, evidence in the district court. Unless that holding was correct the judgment below obviously cannot 132. Id. at 55.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court added:
The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their proper province, and the support of their authorized action, does not require the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the Congress could completely oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law. Id It seemed evident that if the employer had a right to an independent judicial record, independent judicial judgment followed as a matter of course. With the single exception of Ng Fung Ho, however, no decision had yet held that the Constitution required more than an independent judicial judgment on the administrative record.' 3 7
Nonetheless, in Crowell the Court endorsed the broader version of the constitutional fact doctrine:
Assuming that the Federal court may determine for itself the existence of these fundamental or jurisdictional facts, we come to the question,-Upon what record is the determination to be made? . . .We think that the essential independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the enforcement of constitutional rights requires that the Federal court should determine such an issue upon its own record and the facts elicited before it. 138 This statement comes late in the opinion, and the Court's way of putting the point is unsatisfying. The Court said that an independent record requirement is necessary in order to maintain "the essential independence of the exercise of the judicial power," 13 9 a formulation that suggests that article III is not concerned with the personal rights of litigants, but with the institutional independence of the federal adjudicatory process.' 40 On this reasoning, it seems that an independent record is only an adjunct to the more basic requirement of independent judicial judgment, and thus that this procedural safeguard is unnecessary where there is a trial-type administrative proceeding resulting in a formal record. 141 In any event, it soon became apparent that effective regulation presupposed that the agency be permitted to construct the record, even with respect to constitutional facts. 
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW possible a few years after Crowell. In St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 143 the Court, while reaffirming the independent judgment rule in ratesetting cases, broadly retreated from an independent judicial record requirement. ChiefJustice Hughes, Crowell's author, wrote:
But this judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not require or justify disregard of the weight which may properly attach to findings upon hearing and evidence. On the contrary, the judicial duty is performed in the light of the proceedings already had and may be greatly facilitated by the assembling and analysis of the facts in the course of the legislative determination. Judicial judgment may be none the less appropriately independent because informed and aided by the sifting procedure of an expert legislative agency.
144
The ChiefJustice added that" 'in ordinary cases, and where the opportunity is open,' all the pertinent evidence should be submitted in the first instance to the Commission."' 14 5 Indeed, it would take a "clear case" for the Court to consider evidence not presented to the agency. 14 6 After St. Joseph Stock Yards the independent record requirement receded into the constitutional shadows. 8 it is certain that we shall see renewed interest in the independent record requirement. In Northern Pipeline, a divided Court held that article III courts, not legislative courts or administrative agencies, mustfind the underlying facts in common law disputes governed by state law. According to Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, only those "public rights" created by statute may be committed to non-article III tribunals.
14 9
The potential for the resurrection of some form of the independent record requirement is easily illustrated. Suppose, for example, that a student is expelled from a state university following a fairly held discithat requirement of trial de novo would become altogether disruptive of administrative processes).
143 149. See id. at 81 (limiting non-article III adjudication to "congressionally created statutory rights"). This may expand, as well as curtail, the reach of the public rights category. See supra note 106. WhetherJustice Brennan also attempted to distinguish between adjudication by agencies and by legislative courts is unclear. On whether such a distinction is tenable, compare Currie, supra note 101, at 456 & n.85 (recognizing distinction where separate administrative agency employs distinctive nonjudicial procedures and lacks power to enforce its own decisions), with Note, supra note 140, at 1957 n.50 (distinction between adjudication by agencies and courts "may be more theoretical than real").
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[Vol. 85:229 plinary proceeding that found he had engaged in unprotected misconduct. In his reinstatement action in a district court, Bose-wholly apart from Crowell-would require independent judicial judgment on law application. But suppose the student contends that the administrative finding of misconduct is false and that he was expelled because of protected speech activities. What is the court obligated to do? For some, like Professor Hart, article III is not at all implicated: the district court is not being asked to enforce an administrative order, but simply to intervene to correct administrative wrongdoing. 50 Even if we make that assumption, does the student have a constitutional right to review under either the due process clause 5 1 or the first amendment? 5 2 It is unlikely that the Court will directly address this question because section 1983153 appears to authorize such actions.' 54 But does that statute also determine the scope of judicial review? Does section 1983, the first amendment, or article III require an independent judicial record, so that the administrative proceeding is effectively treated as a nullity? 155 In its modern form, Crowell v. Benson suggests that, at most, independent judgment is all that is constitutionally required in the above situation. 15° Indeed, in United States v. Raddatz, 15 7 citing Crowell, the Court held that an article III judge could accept a magistrate's factual findings on a motion to exclude evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.' 5 8 But Raddatz might be distinguished on the ground that the exclusionary rule is not part of the fourth amendment right, but simply a judicially fashioned remedy that a liti-150. It is possible to posit a distinction between courts asked to enforce legal duties and those asked merely to set aside administrative decisions that, standing alone, would not serve as the predicate for further judicial action. See Hart, supra note 102, at 1375-78. I have elaborated upon and criticized that distinction, see Monaghan, supra note 6, at 20-24, but my criticism need not be accepted for the purposes of this Article.
It is, in fact, by no means clear that Hart would apply the enforcement/nonenforcement court distinction to constitutional cases if the litigant could demonstrate a right to review. Id. at 11 n.62.
151. ProfessorJaffe argues that due process requires judicial review of any coercive administrative action. L. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 384-89. But there remains a large question as to what counts as "coercion."
152. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), would not be dispositive in this case because the university's substantive rule-permitting expulsion of disruptive students-is not a content-based restriction. (Lay, J., dissenting) ("A civil rights action under § 1983 is a separate proceeding which requires a trial de novo ....
[A] district judge is not bound by ... prior findings of fact of any state official.").
156. 
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW gant is permitted to assert.1 5 9 Moreover, Northern Pipeline suggests that a broad reconsideration is in order. The plurality not only opined that rights not created by Congress may require more intensive judicial factfinding,' 60 it also emphasized the importance of judicial factfinding on any view of the purposes of article 111. 161 And surely it is difficult to believe that article III requires independent judicial factfinding in diversity cases, but only independent judgment on an administrative record when constitutional rights are at stake. Yet an affirmative requirement ofjudicial factfinding grounded on either article III or the first amendment has startling implications. Any such general requirement seems inconsistent with the practical exigencies of the administrative state. For example, no one yet supposes that the first amendment guarantees independent factfinding by a court when the NLRB has found that an employer has engaged in unprotected "coercive" speech.' 6 2 At this point in our history I would be startled to see the Court decide that a litigant pressing a bona fide constitutional claim could be denied access to the independent judgment of a judicial forum.' 63 Nevertheless, I confess considerable uncertainty over whether the Constitution generally mandates any specific level of independent judicial factfinding. My inclination is to start with Justice Brandeis' attempt in both Crowell and St. Joseph Stock Yards to reformulate the substance of the constitutional fact doctrine. Justice Brandeis asserted that due process sometimes requires judicial process. In this respect, he urged a .sharp distinction between claims of "liberty" and of "property."1 64 In these terms the analysis is troublesome. The general distinction posited between liberty and property has not weathered well in other areas of law, partly in recognition that the Constitution does not appear to 159. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984), strongly emphasizes this rationale.
160.
[W]hile Crowell ... endorsed the proposition that Congress possesses broad discretion to assign factfinding functions ... to aid in the adjudication of congressionally created statutory rights, Crowell does not support the further proposition ... that Congress possesses the same degree of discretion in assigning traditionally judicial power to adjuncts engaged in the adjudication of rights not created by Congress. 458 U.S. at 81-82. Raddatz and Northern Pipeline are hard to reconcile in terms of their general approach. See Currie, supra note 101, at 458-59; Note, supra note 140, at 1957 n.49.
161. See 458 U.S. at 84-86. But Justice Brandeis' analysis rests on a deeper ground. By radically separating due process from article III, he acknowledged that the very existence of the process of administrative adjudication could no longer be considered irreconcilably at variance with the purposes of having article III courts. 1 66 In thus breaking due process concerns free from article III's gravitational pull, Justice Brandeis offered the possibility of a unified framework-one that is equally applicable to federal and state courts-governing the extent to which the Constitution allocates functions between courts and agencies. And, at least in its modern form, due process theory permits a discriminating judicial response to the problems of administrative adjudication, 67 a response that reflects the specific substantive constitutional values at stake rather than generalized notions about the nature of federal judicial power. 166. Justice Brandeis' analysis failed to acknowledge the historically close connection between article III and due process-a connection apparent not only in Crowell itself, see L.Jaffe, supra note 17, at 639, but even more so in the cases that preceded it. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 17.
167. Justice Brandeis emphasized the due process clause. My own preference has been to stress the remedial and procedural dimensions of constitutional provisions with a specific subject matter, such as the first amendment. See Monaghan, supra note 82. On occasion the Supreme Court seems inclined to the latter mode of exposition. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3451 (1983) ("[T]he Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure by which the State imposes the death sentence than with the substantive factors the State lays before the jury .. "). In general, however, the Court follows Brandeis, insisting that the general prohibition against government intrusions contained in the fourth amendment and in the due process clause takes on a special meaning where important substantive constitutional values-such as freedom of speech-are at stake. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) .
168. In the first amendment area, for example, the Court might accept administrative factfinding by administrative agencies with ongoing, carefully structured adjudicatory apparatus, see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), while insisting on independent judicial factfinding where the agency might be thought to be infected with systemic bias against the free speech claim, see, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 82, at 523 (movie censors), or where the agency meets so occasionally that it might be thought to lack sufficient institutional safeguards-for example, school disciplinary panels.
169. These commentators placed major reliance on the Supreme Court's failure to mention the rule in a subsequent rate case, Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 581-82 (1940) . See, e.g., K. Davis, Handbook on Administrative Law § 255 (1951) . But the decline of Crowell's importance in the rate-setting area seems more properly attributable to an abandonment of the requirement of a judicial record, see supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text, and to an important change in the con-
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cize the distinction between constitutional and ordinary facts, both practically and theoretically. It was insisted that no workable line between the two categories existed,' 7 0 and that the practical imperatives of public administration were at variance with attempting any such distinction. 17 The question is of the application of this established principle to the facts disclosed by the record. That the question is one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to determine whether in truth a federal right has been denied. When a federal right has been specially set up and claimed in a state court, it is our province to inquire not merely whether it was denied in express terms but also whether it was denied in substance and trolling substantive constitutional law. In FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) We think that the evidence that for a generation or longer no negro had been called for service on any jury inJackson County, that there were negroes qualified for jury service, that according to the practice of thejury commission their names would normally appear on the preliminary list of male citizens of the requisite age but that no names of negroes were placed on the jury roll, and the testimony with respect to the lack of appropriate consideration of the qualifications of negroes, established the discrimination the Constitution forbids. The motion to quash the indictment upon that ground should have been granted. Id. The Court concluded that the state court's reliance upon the "mere general asseverations" of the jury commissioners to the contrary was not enough. Id 
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW of law and fact; sometimes on the need for review because the conclusions of law and the findings of fact were "intermingled"; sometimes on the need to review the evidence to ensure that the federal right was not denied in substance; and sometimes on the need to determine whether sufficient evidence existed. 18 2 These various formulas obscure the issue. Laid bare, the point is more easily stated: the entire substance of constitutional fact review had become the operative measure of the Supreme Court's general appellate jurisdiction.
Some regard this development as an outgrowth of the premises of Ben Avon, Ng Fung Ho, and Crowell.
18 3 I think that is an error. Constitutional fact review in those cases was concerned with the legitimacy of the administrative state, with its substitution of administrative for judicial adjudication. The dominant concern was the extent to which such a process could displace the pattern of adjudication by regular courts apparently contemplated by the 1787 Constitution. In terms of the constitutional design, the whole process of substituting administrative for judicial adjudication may be thought to suffer from a serious "legitimacy deficit."' 8 4 The constitutional fact doctrine is an effort to overcome this problem, to reconcile the imperatives of the twentieth century administrative state with the constitutional preference for adjudication by the regular courts. It does so by requiring, at a minimum, that a court asked to enforce an administrative order must engage in constitutional fact review. Perhaps the doctrine has a broader bite.' 8 5 But the important point is that it is concerned only with judicial control of administrative conduct.
Quite plainly, no legitimacy deficit can be thought to exist in the adjudications of the inferior courts. The constitutional plan contemplates that state courts can adjudicate federal claims, and that Congress can establish lower federal courts. Accordingly, even on the doubtful premise that judicial control of administrative conduct requires constitutional fact review at the appellate level, 1 8 6 different justifications must state courts' finding as a matter of 'fact'. ...
[ 184. See Currie, supra note 101, at 443-45. I recognize that on principle this argument applies most clearly only at the federal level. A strong form of the argument applied at the state level would run into the doctrine that the Constitution does not impose separation of powers on the states. See supra note 115. But history has its claim here: it is no accident that the early due process cases evidenced a constitutional concern for adequate state judicial control of state administrative conduct where private rights were at stake. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
185. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 20-24. 186. In Crowell, neither the Court nor Justice Brandeis adverted to possible differences between the role of the trial and appellate courts in the context of immediate judicial review of administrative action. Their focus was on the independent judgment requirement at large, so to speak.
[Vol. 85:229 262 CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW be adduced to support such intense review of the findings of inferior judicial tribunals.
Despite the evident distinctions between judicial review of administrative action and judicial review of the conduct of inferior courts, some cases seemingly assumed that constitutional law application was always a task calling for the independent judgment of appellate courts. These authorities need not be examined here. The most that can be said is that they asssumed the necessity or propriety of independent appellate review-they did not purport to demonstrate it.187 Moreover, in recent times when the Supreme Court has spoken of the obligations of the state courts, its most salient reliance has been on specific constitutional guarantees, not on the constitutional fact doctrine of either Crowell or Norris. t8 Thus far the Article has traced the development of the constitutional fact doctrine. In the context of judicial review of administrative action, constitutional fact review may be required because administrative action suffers from a legitimacy deficit. But recognizing that some court should review administrative action provides no basis for a further demand that all subsequent reviewing courts exercise independent judgment. Nor does it compel independent appellate review of the findings of lower federal or state courts in ordinary civil and criminal cases since there is no legitimacy deficit when these courts adjudicate constitutional claims. To be sure, appellate courts often exercise independent judgment with respect to constitutional law application. But I see no persuasive case for converting this competence into a duty.
I do not doubt that, by statute, appellate courts can be charged with the responsibility for constitutional law application, to ensure that, on the evidence, any constitutional right has not been erroneously denied by a lower federal or state court. No litigant's personal rights are infringed by such review, 1 9 2 nor do special federalism considerations forbid it.1 9 3 But, to my mind, independentjudgment on the evidence is constitutionally mandated only when the application issue involves an appreciable measure of additional norm elaboration-that is, where it seems correct to state that the judicial duty to "say what the law is" is implicated. I accept, however, that firmly embedded precedent establishes more: appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have the authority to engage in constitutional fact review in any case, at least absent restrictive legislation. As will be seen, this competence can be supported by justifications going beyond history. However, our immediate concern is with the claim that appellate courts are under a duty to undertake such review.
A. Appellate Duty
Bose insists that appellate courts must exercise independent judgment with respect to constitutional facts relevant to first amendment law application. But to what extent are appellate judges obligated outside the first amendment context to undertake constitutional fact review in all constitutional cases? This question, it should be noted, arises in an extraordinary variety of contexts. For example, must each tier in the state appellate court system make an independent judgment on whether enough evidence exists to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, ' 94 or on whether a specific juror was rightly disqualified because of his views on the death penalty? 19 5 Is the Supreme Court itself required to make a similar determination, at least in the cases in which it grants review? The day cannot be far off when the Court will be faced with the need for a systematic analysis of the entire problem. At that point the Court will see that there are a wide range of is an excellent recent example of limited review of constitutional law application. Over commerce and due process clause objections, the Court upheld application of a state tax to the income of a domestic corporation's foreign subsidiaries. In apparently enlarging the concept of a "unitary business," the decision has been widely interpreted as significantly expanding state taxing power.' 9 7 Curiously, however, no attention has been paid to an aspect of the case that virtually ensured that result. The taxpayer contended that whatever the appropriate legal standard for a unitary business, an important issue remained whether it was one, and on that question it was entitled to the Court's independent judgment. The Court's response is puzzling:
The legal principles defining the constitutional limits on the unitary business principle are now well established. The factual records in such cases, even when the parties enter into a stipulation, tend to be long and complex, and the line between "historical fact" and "constitutional fact" is often fuzzy at best. . . . It will do the cause of legal certainty little good if this Court turns every colorable claim that a state court erred in a particular application of those principles into a de novo adjudication, whose unintended nuances would then spawn further litigation and an avalanche of critical comment. Rather, our task must be to determine whether the state court applied the correct standards to the case; and if it did, whether its judgment "was within the realm of permissible judgment."'
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In a footnote, the Court added that "[t]his approach is, of course, quite different from the one we follow in certain other constitutional contexts," 19 9 citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and a case involving Supreme Court review of a coerced confession claim. 20 0 The Court made no effort to justify an approach "quite different" from that taken with respect to other constitutional claims, and some justification seems required. After all, the records in first amendment and coerced confession cases can be "long and complex," and the "line between 'historical fact' and 'constitutional fact' " is often "fuzzy at best." More important, the Container Corp. Court never explained why either consideration is of constitutional moment. Container Corp. might rest on an unarticulated and undefended neo- 
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW No less than the question of actual malice, questions of intentional segregation and testimonial compulsion could have been held entitled to constitutional fact review. 20 9 These inconsistencies should not be dismissed as involving nothing more than esoteric and unimportant 201 . See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
202. Characterizing the holding in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle that "whether the defendants had intentionally maintained a racially segregated school system at a specified time in the past [is] essentially factual, subject to the clearly-erroneous rule." Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) . Swint itself involved a federal statutory claim.
203. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) . The Court found that the district court had applied "the proper legal standard," id. at 622, and that its factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
204 CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW points of federal jurisdiction, of concern only to the litigants. That the Court sees itself under a duty to exercise independent judgment with respect to some, but not all, constitutional facts suggests that the Court is proceeding on an ad hoc basis, failing to consider the systemic ramifications of its decisions.
More important, the erratic and uncertain state of Supreme Court doctrine has serious consequences in a system of constitutional government. Even if the Court has a penetrating power of review, is talk of its "duty" to engage in such review wholly illusory? If so, should we view the Court's power of review as discretionary? Entirely unconstrained? The confusion about these matters is unsettling. And this uncertainty has an as yet little noticed byproduct: it leaves unclear the nature of the responsibilities of the state and federal judges, both trial and appellate. The current accretion of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction says nothing, at least overtly, to other actors in the judicial system, particularly the state courts.
10
Thus, the question presses: does the Constitution require appellate courts to exercise independent judgment on adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional law application? An attempt to justify such a duty can take one of several forms, although upon examination I find them unconvincing whether taken singly or in combination.
1. -All questions of constitutional law application could be viewed as demanding independent appellate review because of the "importance" of constitutional rights and immunities coupled with the central role of courts in preserving the constitutional order.
2 11 This argument stresses the "importance" of constitutional values, 2 1 2 rather than the danger of distorted factfinding or law application by a specific decisionmaker. While the argument has appeal, its ultimate conclusion seems to be simply asserted, rather than persuasively justified. It is, after all, not obvious that all constitutional rights are more valuable than other rights simply because they are mentioned in the Constitution. If the argument simply reflects a naked bias in favor of constitutional claims, one that seeks only to increase the likelihood that such claims will be vindicated, the bias does not appear to be constitutionally grounded. It is not a premise of our system that the courts are able to detect every violation of the constitutional order. 210. In the federal system, of course, there is no absense of guidance where, as in Swit and Rogers, the Court characterizes specific issues as "factual" and therefore subject to clearly erroneous review. This characterization sends a signal to the lower appellate courts that, in the future, they need not engage in independent judicial review on these issues. 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
To my mind, the real center of this argument is a premise that additional intensive judicial review at the appellate level is needed to prevent an "intolerable" level of incorrectly decided cases-incorrect in the special sense that some court has improperly rejected a constitutional claim. The notion is that the greater the number of courts that look at an issue, the greater the possibility of a "correct" decision. But we have no clear idea of what it means to say that we face the danger of an "intolerable" level of incorrectly denied constitutional claims. Neither the empirical nor the normative reference points for this argument are obvious.
Absent a coherent and convincing theory about the dangers posed by incorrectly denied constitutional claims, I believe that the important judicial role in preserving the constitutional order is adequately insured by the universal judicial duty to expound and refine the applicable constitutional law.
2 14 When necessary, that duty includes further elaboration of the relevant constitutional norms. For I quite agree withJustice Holmes that frequently recurring fact patterns-for example, whether a reporter must check his sources-warrant specific judicial norm elaboration rather than being left to the trier of fact under a more general standard. 21 5 But it remains to be demonstrated that more is necessary; that is, that the system of civil liberties is in material danger unless both the trial and all appellate courts are required to render independent judgment on every application of constitutional norms to the facts. 21 6 2. -The general argument that all constitutional rights need the security of independent appellate review can be abandoned in favor of an argument that the first amendment is special. Two different forms of this argument can be distinguished. The first places stress on the importance of the right rather than upon the dangers of systemically distorted factfinding and law application. The familiar "chilling effect" rhetoric asserts that first amendment values are very fragile and especially vulnerable to an "intolerable" level of deterrence; and the danger of impermissible deterrence is real, as is evidenced by the high rate of 214. This duty includes an examination of the adequacy of the evidence to support the conclusion of the court below. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
215. "But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever?" 0. Holmes, supra note 48, at 98; see United States v. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. 687, 692 n.8 (1985) ("When faced with a recurring situation ... the Courts of Appeals should not be reluctant to formulate a clear rule of law to deal with that situation."). Thus, at some point, the Court must elaborate whether under the actual malice rule a reporter must investigate his sources. E.g., Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
216. It should be noted, however, that Ben Avon and Crowell may require that some court make an independent judgment on the law application point, at least before it can enforce the determination of an administrative agency. See supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
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